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Harry H. Schwartz
Harry H. Schwartz
First Secretary of Embassy

Authority NND 887424
By erk NARA. Date 2/14/90

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Despatch No. 1043
December 16, 1957
From AmEmbassy Bonn

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I said his point with respect to the Soviets implied a willingness to bargain over this question and presumably a willingness to give up the right to possess such weapons. Baudissin fully agreed this was the implication of his point of view and reiterated his belief this was the course which the West should follow.

Baudissin then said he thought Kennan was right, only premature. As soon as Germany has sufficient military strength itself, the West should attempt to obtain the removal of Soviet military force from Europe in return for the withdrawal of British, French and American troops. It would be too dangerous to do this now, but when Germany is militarily strong it should be able to ward off initial blows until help could come and the West's retaliatory force could become effective.

In response to my question, Baudissin made it clear he was expressing only his ^{own} views about Kennan's ideas. This was not "Government thinking". It would be unfortunate if it were since the effectiveness of such planning and bargaining with respect to the Soviets will depend in part on the Soviets not knowing the limits of this position.

In connection with the reunification problem, Baudissin also said that at some stage Western Germany would have to deal with Eastern Germany, that is Pankow. This point had not yet been reached but when the stage was ripe for bargaining on reunification, such direct negotiations with the East Zone authorities would undoubtedly prove to be a necessary, practical step towards reunification.

Comment: The above remarks by Baudissin with respect to Kennan and discussions with Pankow do not reflect current policies of the Federal Republic. They are also only views expressed by a working level official in the Foreign Office. However, they are of some significance in view of the fact that Baudissin takes an orthodox, pro-NATO, pro-Western line on questions affecting German security and reunification.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 14, 1957

SUBJECT: NATO-German Problems

PARTICIPANTS: Graf von Baudissin, Foreign Office
David Linebaugh, American Embassy, Bonn

(Highlights of this conversation were reported by telegram.
Other points, outlined below, may be of interest).

Graf von Baudissin said he saw nothing inconsistent between the US paper on IRBMs, which has been submitted for the NATO meeting, and the line von Eckardt, Federal Press Chief, has been taking publicly, i.e., it is not expected that decisions on IRBMs will be made at the meeting and the questioning of their stationing in the Federal Republic is not yet "actual". Baudissin said he felt the meeting should not go beyond a decision "in principle" with respect to IRBMs. In the first place, the members of NATO have not yet received a detailed military assessment of where IRBMs should be stationed and specific information regarding delivery dates, etc. Furthermore, if NATO were over-hasty in this regard, an unfavorable reaction would doubtless be created in the neutral, uncommitted countries and difficult political problems might also arise in some Western European countries. Finally, the stationing of IRBMs in Germany and their possession by the Federal Republic would appear to violate the spirit of the Paris Treaties (the Protocols to the Brussels Treaty) in which Germany renounced strategic weapons.

Baudissin said the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense were fully agreed that it would be a mistake for the NATO meeting to decide that Germany should have IRBMs. The time was not ripe for such a decision. This might come later, perhaps at the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers which, it has been suggested, should be held in March 1958. However, Baudissin emphasized that NATO should not make a decision that Germany would not possess such weapons. This possibility constituted a strong bargaining weapon with respect to the Soviets and should be retained for that purpose.

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